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NOTES
WE  STILL  HAVE  LESSONS  TO  LEARN
FROM  WOBURN,  AND  FLINT  IS  A
GOOD  PLACE  TO  START
Rose Mooney*
INTRODUCTION
The United States protects its citizens’ right to bear arms, but clean
water costs extra.  Americans enjoy freedoms of religion and speech, vast eco-
nomic opportunities, and a political voice, yet millions lack access to safe
drinking water.1  Lead leaches from our cities’ pipes in Flint and Newark,
uranium taints our Native American lands in the Southwest, and sewage
seeps through our rural groundwaters in Alabama.2  The toxic compounds
used when manufacturing everyday products like Teflon cause birth defects,
infertility, and thyroid disease,3 and the lead in our water pipes slows cogni-
tive and behavioral development in children.4  Americans also suffer from
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Arts in
Environmental Politics and Spanish, Saint Anselm College, 2017.  I would like to thank
Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his encouragement and guidance during this writing process.
Thank you to my friends on the Notre Dame Law Review for their thoughtful edits and
advice.  All errors are my own.
1 See Justin Worland, America’s Clean Water Crisis Goes Far Beyond Flint.  There’s No Relief
in Sight, TIME (Feb. 20, 2020), https://time.com/longform/clean-water-access-united-
states/.
2 Id.
3 Katelyn Newman, Report: Water Contamination Widespread Across U.S., U.S. NEWS (May
6, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2019-05-06/contaminated-
water-from-teflon-chemical-found-in-43-states-report-finds.
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various types of organ failures and cancers as a result of drinking contami-
nated water, and we have known this for years.5
Although United Nations declarations and international law deem clean
water a human right, the United States does not, and in 2019, more than
thirty million Americans lived in communities with unsafe water systems.6
Like many environmental crises, clean water access exposes socioeconomic
injustices.  Water contamination disproportionately hinders poor and minor-
ity communities: “Not only are water quality violations more likely to occur
with water systems that service minority or low-income populations, but oft-
discussed solutions . . . such as privatization and regionalization . . . fail to
address the unique barriers that poor communities and communities of color
face.”7  Unsafe drinking water is not a unique issue.  It is not an urban issue
and it is not a novel issue.  For decades we have read the newspaper articles.8
We have watched and rewatched Hollywood movies like Erin Brockovich, A
Civil Action, and Dark Waters, which humanize the plague of unsafe drinking
water.  We know it is a problem, but what are we doing to fix it?
Many critics point to holes in our federal administrative agencies: “We
have a broken water program in the United States.  The EPA [Environmental
Protection Agency] is asleep at the switch.”9  For example, of the approxi-
mately 120,000 chemicals in commerce in the United States each day, the
EPA regulates only seventy of them.10  Other critiques focus on the lack of
funding: “Present levels of federal funding are woefully inadequate to
5 See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (offering a detailed account of
scientific studies from the 1980s detailing negative health effects of contaminated drinking
water in Woburn, Massachusetts).
6 See Worland, supra note 1 (referencing EPA data from the beginning of 2019).
7 Madison Condon, Rural America’s Drinking Water Crisis, AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/
vol—44—no-2—housing/rural-america-s-drinking-water-crisis/; see also Worland, supra
note 1 (“As with basically all environmental and climate issues, poor people and minority
communities are hit hardest. . . .  [T]he root of [the public health problem] varies from
place to place . . . .  But the downstream effects are strikingly similar: damage to health that
exacerbates the trials of poverty and a frayed social safety net.  These in turn become years
wiped off life expectancy and points lost from IQ scores.”).
8 See, e.g., Paula DiPerna, Leukemia Victim’s Mom Pinpoints Poisoned Neighborhood, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 18, 1985), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1985-02-18-85011
00069-story.html; Gene I. Maeroff, Trial Set in Suit over 7 Cancer Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
1986, at 36; Newman, supra note 3; Michael Weisskopf, Did Water Kill Children in Woburn?
In Bellwether Case, Massachusetts Families Link Contamination with Leukemia, WASH. POST (Apr.
3, 1986), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/04/03/did-water-kill-
children-in-woburnin-bellwether-case-massachusetts-families-link-contamination-with-leuke-
mia/34969aef-65c7-4430-96b8-feecb9d3f9c3/; Worland, supra note 1.
9 Catherine Nouhan, Contaminated Drinking Water Is America’s Most Significant Public
Crisis, Says Author and Activist, MICH. RADIO (Nov. 14, 2019), https://
www.michiganradio.org/post/contaminated-drinking-water-america-s-most-significant-pub-
lic-crisis-says-author-and-activist (quoting Seth Siegel, author of Troubled Water: What’s
Wrong with What We Drink (alteration in original)).
10 Id.
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address America’s mounting drinking water crisis.  In 2019, just $2.8 billion
was allocated through appropriations for all water infrastructure projects
nationwide—less than one half of a percent of the amount of investment the
EPA estimates is needed.”11  Despite the scale of this national crisis, there is
“no great urgency . . . felt in Washington, D.C., or in state capitals” to give
emergency aid.12  Importantly, inadequate funding is not just a federal issue;
many municipalities and states have turned to unsafe water sources as a
means of saving money on a tight local budget.13  Most critics also highlight
the general pattern of putting industry above all else, using decades of insuf-
ficient industry regulation to signal to Americans that their health is not as
important as industrial growth.14  Despite the differing causal arguments,
those concerned agree that clean water access is drowning at the bottom of
the country’s priority list.  “Laws may be out of date, and existing rules
ignored, but as an ‘issue,’ water seems to sprout up only when a seemingly
one-off event like the Flint water crisis captures public attention.”15
But Flint is not a “one-off” event.  American cities have endured similar
water crises for decades, and this Note demonstrates how Flint reflects a pat-
tern in our country’s history.  By analyzing a previous water contamination
lawsuit, this Note offers advice to litigants battling their current water crises.
Specifically, this Note assesses the water contamination crisis that occurred in
Woburn, Massachusetts, from the mid- to late-twentieth century and offers
guidance to litigants fighting for clean water in Flint, Michigan, today.  There
is strength in this type of comparison: “Change in legislative actions and pol-
icy-making often result from previous environmental disasters out of which
the public demands a change.  In other words, we arguably learn from these
disasters and effect changes to prevent them from occurring again.”16  The
11 Condon, supra note 7.
12 Worland, supra note 1.
13 See HARR, supra note 5, at 22–23; Mitch Smith, Flint Water Prosecutors Drop Criminal
Charges, with Plans to Keep Investigating, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/06/13/us/flint-water-crisis-charges-dropped.html.  Oftentimes the financial
burden extends to residents, themselves, to pay a higher municipal or state tax, which
becomes a problem when these residents live below the poverty line to begin with.
“[C]ontaminated water helps account for social decay.  Residents on a desperate quest for
safe water routinely drive for hours to buy and stash it.  Jeremiah Kerley, 61, says he
hitchhikes to Flagstaff to sell his plasma.  ‘It’s a source of income. . . .  ‘I use that to pay for
our water.’”  Worland, supra note 1.
14 See generally HARR, supra note 5. See also Condon, supra note 7 (listing other poten-
tial factors: “Poor regulation of agricultural waste and other pollutants, shrinking popula-
tions, and aging infrastructure all contribute to the increasing incidents of water quality
violations dotting the rural landscape.”).
15 Worland, supra note 1.
16 Brie D. Sherwin, Pride and Prejudice and Administrative Zombies: How Economic Woes,
Outdated Environmental Regulations, and State Exceptionalism Failed Flint, Michigan, 88 U.
COLO. L. REV. 653, 665, 654, 667–71 (2017) (footnote omitted) (citing water contamina-
tion events in Woburn in 1972, Washington, D.C., in 2001, and Sebring, Ohio, in 2016 to
offer regulatory changes to the “lack of federal oversight contribut[ing] to the [water]
crisis”).
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Woburn litigation illustrates critical weaknesses and strengths of a plaintiff’s
toxic tort lawsuit, and a historical analysis offers useful guidelines for today’s
litigants.
Nearly four decades have passed since families in east Woburn sued two
large companies for contaminating their groundwater with toxic chemicals,
thereby causing their children to develop leukemia and various other ill-
nesses.17  During the complex nine-year litigation, multiple plaintiffs died
from leukemia.18  The EPA uncovered hundreds of barrels of toxic waste
near the water source and listed Woburn as a “Superfund” site.19  But the
court ultimately awarded the plaintiffs a “half a loaf” win, exonerating one of
the companies.20  The fight for clean water in Woburn made national head-
lines, becoming the foundation for a book and Hollywood movie titled A
Civil Action.21  However, those involved concede that we have a great deal to
learn from this lawsuit.22  This Note will demonstrate that the Woburn plain-
tiffs made their case more difficult by listing every individual as a plaintiff in
the complaint, segmenting the trial, and using special verdict forms for the
jury.  Today, residents of Flint, Michigan, commence the seventh year of their
battle for clean water, and plaintiffs should look to Woburn to avoid costly
mistakes.23
Since the Woburn crisis in the 1970s, water law and the EPA have exper-
ienced drastic growth.  Nonetheless, comparing these two contamination
sites is appropriate because the cities themselves and the events leading up to
the contamination present striking similarities.24  Woburn and Flint are small
industrial cities, overshadowed by their states’ larger and richer cities to the
southeast.25  Both contaminations occurred when the municipal govern-
ments switched water sources as a means of saving money and reluctant local
17 See generally HARR, supra note 5.
18 See generally id.
19 See id. at 78.
20 See Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Really Going On?”  A Study of Lawyer and Scientist Inter-
Disciplinary Discourse, 25 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 181, 206–15 (1999) (summarizing a
conference the author attended, entitled “Lessons From A Civil Action: Environmental
Torts and the Woburn Litigation,” a dialogue between the clients, lawyers, and experts in
the lawsuit). See generally HARR, supra note 5.
21 See generally HARR, supra note 5.
22 See generally LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION
TO A CIVIL ACTION, at xi-xxvii (4th ed., 2008) (quoting Attorney Charles Nesson, “My best
lesson from Woburn: Understand and learn from your mistakes”); Jerome P. Facher, The
View from the Bottomless Pit: Truth, Myth, and Irony in A Civil Action, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
243 (1999) (providing a personal account of his experience as a defense attorney in the
litigation).  To understand the case’s national popularity, see DiPerna, supra note 8; Maer-
off, supra note 8; Weisskopf, supra note 8, which provide examples of newspaper articles
from the Washington Post, New York Times, and Chicago Tribune.
23 See Carmody, supra note 4.
24 See infra Parts I–II.
25 See Carmody, supra note 4; Maeroff, supra note 8.
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aid followed.26  Attorney Jan Richard Schlichtmann’s summary of the
Woburn lawsuit acts as a fitting summary for Flint, as well:
[The] conviction became a shared determination to get answers when the
families learned the water that they had been told was safe was not, that it
was contaminated . . . .  Their frustration at the apparent unwillingness of
state and federal authorities to help provide answers led to their seeking
out . . . lawyers . . . to help them in their cause.27
Part I of this Note discusses the water contamination in Woburn and the
litigation that ensued.  Part II then illustrates the events that have occurred
in Flint thus far.  Next, Part III combines the previous Parts to discourage
future litigants from drafting complex complaints, segmenting the trial, and
employing complex jury verdict forms.  Plaintiffs in Flint can successfully
achieve justice in their fight for clean water if they avoid these three tenden-
cies.  Finally, Part IV concludes with an overview of the nation’s current water
law and offers critiques to our federal administrative regulations.
I. WOBURN, MASSACHUSETTS28
A. Contamination
Before 1964 and the leukemia clusters, the city of Woburn prided itself
on its tanneries.29  The city’s first business was a tannery built in 1648, and by
the time the Civil War began, Woburn boasted twenty established tanneries,
many of which operated along the banks of the Aberjona River.30  Despite
being a geographically small city, Woburn gained national attention with the
nickname “Tan City” for its ability to match Philadelphia in the nation’s pro-
duction of leather.31  The success of the tanning industry encouraged other
industrial growth in town, and chemical factories began replacing the marsh,
bogs, and orchards in east Woburn.32  The New York Times described the city
as such in 1986: “Woburn, a hilly, working-class town of modest wooden
houses and small ranch homes 12 miles northwest of Boston, has been a hub
of small manufacturers since the mid-19th century, and its 35,000 residents
have been accustomed to living side-by-side with the factories that provide
26 See HARR, supra note 5, at 22; Carmody, supra note 4.
27 GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at xxvi.
28 While the description of events in Woburn appears lengthy, it is necessary to discuss
the details that foreshadow the litigation.  Aside from differing side effects of
contamination, residents from Woburn and Flint share nearly identical stories of a blue-
collar city centered around a local industry, home to a modest population, and silenced by
municipal and state officials.
29 See HARR, supra note 5, at 12–13.
30 See id.
31 Id. at 12.
32 See id. at 12–13.  Robert Eaton established a chemical factory along the Aberjona
River in 1853 which found success in supplying the local tanneries with their needed chem-
icals, such as sulfuric acid and blue vitriol. Id. It became one of the largest chemical plants
in the country. Id.
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their livelihoods.”33  Woburn flourished as a blue-collar community, and
even today, the public high school mascot is the Woburn “Tanner[ ].”34
During the 1960s, the city began to turn their backs on the tanning
industry when leather demand fell and the water taste changed.35  To be
specific, “it became clear that the moment of change began in November
1964, when a new city well started pumping water into the Woburn system.”36
Previously, a groundwater aquifer near Horn Pond in the southern portion
of the city supplied water to all Woburn residents via six wells.37  But officials
feared water was becoming scarce.38  Residents immediately confided in one
another, asking if the water “tast[ed] funny” in their homes, too.39  The city
had installed a new water well, Well G, in the west bank of the Aberjona River
after it became evident that the city would need more water.40  The state
Metropolitan District Commission had offered the city additional water since
there were more residents using more water and hotter and drier seasons
exacerbated the demand; but Woburn sought a cheaper alternative.41  Not
long after Well G was in place, Woburn dug another well, Well H, in the
Aberjona marsh, and in 1967 Well H began pumping the same water to east
Woburn residents.42  City officials hired an engineering firm to locate this
new water source and, after digging the new well, the engineers assured the
mayor, “We feel the city is fortunate in finding an additional groundwater
supply of good quality in east Woburn. . . .  The development of this supply
will aid in overcoming the city’s Water Problem.”43
Residents in Woburn, however, felt less hopeful, and neighbors like
Anne Anderson and Carol Gray voiced their concerns immediately.  “Anne’s
neighbors in east Woburn would talk among themselves about the water the
way most other people would talk about the weather.  Like the weather, it
seemed there was nothing one could do about the water, although people
kept trying.”44  Residents called city officials and frustration grew with the
lack of response: “It was the same story all the time. . . .  There wasn’t any
problem with the water; the water had been tested and it was fine.”45
33 Maeroff, supra note 8.
34 See HARR, supra note 5, at 12.
35 See id. at 13.
36 Id. at 22.
37 See id.
38 See Dan Kennedy, Death and Justice: Environmental Tragedy and the Limits of Science,
MEDIA NATION, https://dankennedy.net/woburn-files/death-and-justice-environmental-
tragedy-and-the-limits-of-science/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2020).




43 Id. The city of Woburn hired engineers from Whitman & Howard, with L.E. Pitten-
dreigh as head engineer and spokesman for the firm. Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 24.
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Just months after the installation of Well H, the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Health recognized “the poor bacterial quality of the water supplied
therefrom” and threatened to shut down the wells.46  As a means of compro-
mising, Woburn officials instituted chlorination in Wells G and H in April
1968.47  The chlorination sparked more complaints from residents who
stated “the water is very unpotable, very hard, and has a strong chemical
taste.”48  To cope with the public backlash, the Woburn City Council organ-
ized a special committee to address the water issue.49  As city unrest grew, the
engineers pledged to the special committee that “the chlorine, which was the
source of complaints about the taste and odor, was added to the water to kill
bacteria.  The rusty color came from the water’s naturally high iron and man-
ganese content.”50  The engineers further insisted that “the water was per-
fectly safe to drink.”51
In the midst of this public feud, residents of east Woburn’s Pine Street
neighborhood adjacent to the Aberjona River became increasingly con-
cerned with their health.52  The Anderson family’s three-year-old son Jimmy
was diagnosed with leukemia, and soon after the Andersons learned that the
two families on either side of their home also had young boys with leuke-
mia.53  Other neighbors, like the Kane family, brought their children into
the hospital when their respiratory infections transformed into lingering
fevers, irritability, and earaches.54  Doctors at Massachusetts General Hospital
later confirmed these were symptoms of acute lymphocytic leukemia, adding
to the number of diagnosed children in east Woburn.55  Neighbors grew
increasingly suspicious and acknowledged that “[t]he water and the air were
the two things we all shared. . . .  And the water was bad.”56
After years of expressing concern, east Woburn residents organized their
efforts into a formal committee in 1969 to force the mayor to close Wells G
and H.57  The wells were first closed in October 1969, after the summer water
demands subsided.58  But the city continued reopening Wells G and H for






52 See id. at 14.
53 Id. at 14–15, 18 (noting that children of the Zona and the Nagle families also had
leukemia).
54 Id. at 20.  The Kane family lived on Henry Avenue, a street that curves around the
Aberjona marsh.  The Pine Street neighborhood houses can be seen from the back door of
the Kane’s house, a quarter of a mile away across the marsh. Id. at 21.
55 Id. at 20.
56 Id. at 21 (quoting Anne Anderson’s thoughts on water being the common cause of
their health effects).
57 Id. at 23.
58 Id.
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the following years to combat drought risks and dry summers.59  On one
hand, the city engineers continued assuring residents the water was “abso-
lutely safe” to drink.60  But on the other hand, city councilmen said “com-
plaints about the odor and taste began ‘to pour again like so much water
through a broken dam,’” and they “had been ‘bombarded by calls of com-
plaint’ about the ‘putrid, ill-smelling, and foul water.’”61  Anne Anderson
described the town water in a deposition as such:
The rest of the time, when we could mask the flavor of it with Zarex or
orange juice or coffee or whatever, then we used water from the tap.  But
you couldn’t even mask it.  It ruined the dishwasher.  The door corroded to
such a degree that it had to be replaced.  The prongs that hold the dishes
just gave way and broke off.  On a regular basis, the pipes under the kitchen
sink would leak, and under the bathroom sink.  The faucets had to be
replaced.62
The back and forth battles between the residents’ concerns and the
city’s apprehensive assurances grew into intense debate once their children
relapsed and started dying from leukemia.63  Between 1969 and 1985, sixteen
children in Woburn died of leukemia and eight more children suffered from
the disease.64  The National Cancer Institute claims “the average incidence of
leukemia is 3.74 cases per 100,000 children,” and Woburn represented just
36,000 residents at that time.65  In the Pine Street neighborhood alone,
twelve cases of leukemia had been reported, and six of those cases were all
within blocks of Anne Anderson’s home.66  “The odds against six cases within
a half-mile radius, according to the Centers for Disease Control [(CDC)], are
100 to 1.”67  The Washington Post put it simply: “For years, residents on the
east side of this frayed, blue-collar town had two overriding troubles: [t]heir
drinking water was foul, and their children were being stricken with leukemia
at rates as high as eight times the national average.”68
B. Wells Close Permanently
In the spring of 1979, Woburn police discovered 184 barrels of industrial
waste dumped on vacant land along the Aberjona River, and as a result, a
state environmental inspector insisted on testing water samples from nearby
59 Id. at 23–24.
60 Id. at 23.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 21.
63 Id. at 28–36 (describing the deaths of Jimmy Anderson, Jarrod Aufiero, and Carl
Robbins III).
64 DiPerna, supra note 8.
65 Id.  The Woburn Advisory Panel to the Massachusetts Department of Health stated
six cases of leukemia would have been normal.  Maeroff, supra note 8.
66 DiPerna, supra note 8.
67 Id.
68 Weisskopf, supra note 8.
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Wells G and H.69  Gerald McCall, the acting director for the northeast region
of Massachusetts environmental department (today known as the Massachu-
setts Department of Environmental Protection), received the test sample
results on May 22, 1979, and told the Woburn city engineer to shut the wells
off immediately.70  “Both of the wells were ‘heavily contaminated’ with tri-
chloroethylene, commonly known as TCE, an industrial solvent used to dis-
solve grease and oil.”71  Specifically, the “lab found 267 parts per billion of
TCE in Well G, and 183 in Well H,” along with four other contaminants.72
Heavy concentrations of TCE and perchlorethylene (PCE) are “both
regarded by the [EPA] as potential human carcinogens that also can cause
liver, kidney[,] and nervous system damage in high doses.  They are com-
monly used by industry to clean grease from machines.”73
The Woburn Daily Times reported the testing and closing of Wells G and
H, and also included a quote from a Woburn engineer who promised the
community “the water coming into their homes is potable and there is no
fear in drinking it.”74  Wells G and H pumped as much as one million gallons
of water a day for fifteen years.75  Upon receiving the staggering water test
results, the state environmental department permanently closed the wells on
May 22, 1979.76
That first discovery of toxic waste forced the city to close the wells, but a
second discovery jumpstarted the lawsuit.  On September 10, 1979, the
Woburn Daily Times headline read: “LAGOON OF ARSENIC DISCOVERED
IN N. WOBURN.”77  Journalist Charles C. Ryan reported that construction
workers uncovered a toxic swamp one mile from Wells G and H: “a half-
buried lagoon, nearly an acre in size and five feet deep, that was contami-
nated with arsenic, lead, chromium, and traces of other heavy metals.”78
This news report was the tipping point, and days later residents met with
Reverend Bruce Young of Woburn’s Trinity Episcopal Church to discuss an
69 See HARR, supra note 5, at 36.  The “midnight dumper” who was responsible for
dumping the toxic waste was never caught, but police removed the barrels before the waste
caused harm.  Nonetheless, the state environmental inspector insisted on testing water
from Wells G and H because those wells were situated half a mile south. Id.
70 Id.; see Kennedy, supra note 38.
71 HARR, supra note 5, at 36.
72 Id.
73 Weisskopf, supra note 8.
74 See HARR, supra note 5, at 37.  The engineer quoted in the newspaper was Thomas
Mernin, who lived a quarter of a mile from Wells G and H and next door to the Toomey
family.  The Toomey family’s second eldest son fell ill with leukemia in June 1979. Id. at
37–38.
75 Id. at 39.
76 Id. at 36.
77 Id. at 38.
78 Id. at 39.
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action plan—to find out once and for all what was in their water and what it
was doing to their health.79
C. Litigation
In 1980, eight Woburn families, thirty-three individuals in total, agreed
to representation by attorney Jan Richard Schlichtmann.80  Initial progress
was slow, as attorneys waited for results from investigations with the EPA and
Centers for Disease Control before proceeding with the lawsuit.81  On Janu-
ary 18, 1981, the CDC and Massachusetts Department of Public Health
released a report revealing “a significant concentration of cases in the eastern
part of Woburn, where the incidence of [leukemia] disease was at least seven
times greater than expected.”82  Then, in 1982, the EPA released a prelimi-
nary report identifying high concentrations of the chemical TCE around
Wells G and H and put Woburn on the EPA’s recently created “Superfund”
list.83  East Woburn was ranked thirty-ninth on a list of 418 sites, a priority list
based on “a formula that involved the proximity of the polluted area to resi-
dential areas, the nature of the chemicals involved, and whether or not drink-
ing water had been contaminated.”84  Thus, the east Woburn site was among
the agency’s top priorities to clean up.
Although the EPA report had yet to specify the source of the contamina-
tion, a Princeton University professor helped attorney Schlichtmann narrow
down a list of suspects.  As an “expert in groundwater contamination and
hazardous wastes,”85 the professor identified
79 Id. at 39–41.  These meetings led to the formation of the community group FACE,
or “For a Cleaner Environment.” See Kennedy, supra note 38.
80 For a thorough case summary, see generally Robert F. Blomquist, Bottomless Pit:
Toxic Trials, the American Legal Profession, and Popular Perceptions of the Law, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 953 (1996) (book review of HARR, supra note 5).  Although a number of attorneys
represented the plaintiffs during the litigation, attorney Jan Richard Schlichtmann ulti-
mately took over as lead counsel.  Id. at 967; see GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at
xxx; HARR, supra note 5, at 45–47.
81 See GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at xxx; Blomquist, supra note 80, at 964–67.
82 HARR, supra note 5, at 49–50 (“‘Although the contaminants in wells G and H are
not known to cause leukemia, the fact that organic contaminants were found in the water
supply must be emphasized.’  The report pointed out that the wells had been ‘on line
during the presumed critical exposure period of the childhood leukemia cases and they
served primarily the eastern part of Woburn.’”).
83 See Blomquist, supra note 80, at 965–66.  Attorney Schlichtmann was able to access
the EPA’s preliminary investigative report through attorney Anthony Roisman, the Execu-
tive Director for a public interest firm named Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, who
obtained EPA documents via the Freedom of Information Act.  Attorney Roisman and his
public interest firm would provide assistance to Schlichtmann throughout the litigation.
Id. In addition to Roisman, a Harvard law professor named Charles Nesson also helped
Schlichtmann strategize as plaintiff’s appellate counsel. Id. at 955–56; see also HARR, supra
note 5, at 235–38.
84 HARR, supra note 5, at 78.
85 Id.
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two Fortune 500 companies with manufacturing facilities in the immediate
vicinity of Wells G and H . . . as probable sources of the TCE that had con-
taminated the east Woburn drinking water.  These two companies were W.R.
Grace, a multinational chemical company, and Beatrice Foods, manufac-
turer of an assortment of consumer products.86
Considering Woburn’s industrial history, especially along the Aberjona River,
multiple companies could have been responsible for polluting Wells G and
H.  The EPA’s preliminary report listed various potential polluters in the
area, but insisted “[f]urther study is required.”87  Nonetheless, plaintiffs
chose to focus the lawsuit against two companies: W.R. Grace & Company
and Beatrice Foods Company.88
W.R. Grace & Company owned the Cryovac Division food-packaging
equipment manufacturing plant, which was situated 2400 feet northeast of
the wells.89  Employees there used various solvents to dilute paint, clean
tools, and cut grease.90  Beatrice Foods Company purchased the last remain-
ing Woburn tannery, the John J. Riley Company tannery, in 1978 and
assumed all legal liability for environmental matters.91  This building is sepa-
rated from the Aberjona Rivers by a fifteen-acre lot which tanners used as a
dumping ground for chemicals.92
As local counsel, attorney Schlichtmann filed the complaint in Massa-
chusetts Superior Court for Middlesex County on May 14, 1982, just days
before the three-year statute of limitations expired.93  The complaint spans
nearly forty pages, claims that W.R. Grace and Beatrice Foods poisoned the
groundwater near Wells G and H by “the willful and grossly negligent” dump-
86 Blomquist, supra note 80, at 966.  News articles would later report that the EPA
traced the industrial pollution to its highest levels, called “plumes,” and pinpointed two
specific areas.  Weisskopf, supra note 8 (“One plume originated northeast of the wells,
behind a food-packaging machine plant owned by [W.R.] Grace.  High concentrations of
the chemicals also were found southwest of the wells on 15 acres of marshy, wooded land
bordering the Aberjona on one side and a tannery on the other.  Beatrice [Food Com-
pany] bought the tannery and adjacent land in 1978 and agreed to assume all environmen-
tal liabilities of the property.”).
87 HARR, supra note 5, at 78.
88 See GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 62; Blomquist, supra note 80, at 966;
Kennedy, supra note 38.  It should be noted that a third company was briefly involved in
the lawsuit.  As a means of defense, W.R. Grace attorneys dragged Unifirst Corporation
into litigation after the EPA’s preliminary report implicated UniFirst’s practices in the con-
tamination.  UniFirst Corporation was an industrial dry-cleaning company located two
thousand feet north of Wells G and H, and employees there often used the chemical PCE.
UniFirst reached a quick settlement agreement with plaintiffs for one million and fifty
thousand dollars. See HARR, supra note 5, at 144–46; Kennedy, supra note 38.




93 See GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at xxx; HARR, supra note 5, at 75 (noting
that the statute of limitations began running on May 22, 1979, the day the city closed Wells
G and H).
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ing of toxic chemicals over the years, and seeks compensatory and punitive
damages and an injunction to clean up the contamination.94  The complaint
states, “[p]laintiffs and plaintiffs’ decedents have either contracted fatal ill-
nesses, been exposed to a significant risk of contracting fatal or otherwise
serious illnesses and/or suffered significant mental anguish as a result of the
contamination of their drinking water.”95  The complaint further discusses
various contaminants found in the groundwater and highlights the dangers
to human health; for example, “(TCE) . . . is a potent central nervous system
depressant and can cause severe neurological symptoms . . . .  EPA’s recom-
mendation with regard to standards for drinking water is that . . . exposure of
TCE through ingestion of contaminated water . . . should be zero.”96
Following the filing of the complaint, a nine-year litigation ensued which
Judge Walter Skinner presided over in federal court.97  Attorney William
Cheeseman of Foley, Hoag & Eliot represented W.R. Grace98 and attorney
Jerome Facher, chairman of the litigation department at Hale and Dorr, rep-
resented Beatrice Foods.99  The adversarial relationship between the parties,
in addition to the witty and controversial demeanor of the judge, created a
media spectacle mimicking courtroom scenes on television.100  It is difficult
to overstate the complexity of this case, as attorneys invoked nearly every Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure.101  And it is difficult to overstate the burden it
cast on each individual involved, especially plaintiffs’ attorneys who went
bankrupt as a result of this trial.102  This Note assesses the earliest motions
94 HARR, supra note 5, at 81; see also GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 61–80
(reprinting Second Amended Complaint, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 498 U.S. 891
(1990) (No. 82-1672)).
95 GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 63.  The “Endangerment of and Injury to
Plaintiffs” section of the complaint is staggering in the way that it lists the eight children
who died or suffered from leukemia and lists others at serious risk. Id. at 72–78.
96 Id. at 68–69.
97 See HARR, supra note 5, at 105 (noting that defendants successfully removed the case
from state court to the U.S. district court in Boston).  For all parts of the case, see Anderson
v. Cryovac, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983) (ruling on motion to dismiss); Anderson v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986) (ruling on motion for summary judg-
ment); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) (ruling on appeal on withheld
scientific study); Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1 (D. Mass. 1989) (ruling on
posttrial discovery sanctions dispute on remand); Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D.
394 (D. Mass. 1989) (ruling on continued discovery sanctions dispute); Anderson v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1990) (ruling on appeal on the merits); and Anderson v.
Beatrice Foods Co., 498 U.S. 891 (1990) (denying cert.).
98 See HARR, supra note 5, at 95 (noting that although Cheeseman did not go to trial
often, “[h]e specialized in pretrial maneuvering”).
99 See id. at 90 (“[Facher] had many important corporate clients, but none was larger
or wealthier than Beatrice.”).  Attorney Facher also taught Harvard Law School’s famous
trial practice course. Id.
100 See generally id.
101 See generally GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22.
102 See generally id. Due to the complexity of this case in relation to the length of this
Note, this Note will not address all parts of the litigation.  Instead, this Note provides a
mere overview of the trial, followed by an in-depth discussion of specific parts of the trial.
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and the jury trial on the merits (Anderson I and Anderson II),103 both of which
are summarized well in the First Circuit’s opinion on appeal, Anderson v.
Croyovac.104  The important features of this litigation will be discussed in
depth in Part III, but it is helpful to summarize various aspects of the trial
here.
First, the skillful “pretrial maneuvering” by the defendants generated
large litigation costs, delayed the trial, and irritated a judge who already
lacked patience for meritless claims.105  Defendant W.R. Grace tried to dis-
miss the case on a Rule 11 motion at the outset of the trial in November
1982, and when Judge Skinner denied the motion, stating the EPA reports
and the CDC’s study of the leukemia cluster constituted sufficient grounds
for filing the complaint,106 defendants continued filing motion after
motion.107
Second, the vast amount of discovery required depositions of dozens of
witnesses and collections of thousands of documents, tasks which also contin-
ued to extend the deadline for the completion of discovery.108  Many
Woburn residents felt reluctant to testify; some did not want to relive the
deaths of their children and others did not want to dishonor the tannery
where they had worked for decades.109  While deposing John J. Riley, the
manager of the Beatrice tannery, attorney Schlichtmann engaged in a shout-
ing match with the witness when he denied using TCE at the tannery, denied
dumping chemicals on the fifteen acres of land around the building, and
denied keeping records of chemicals used.110  Judge Skinner reprimanded
103 For clarification purposes, this Note will use “Anderson I” to refer to Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983), and “Anderson II” to refer to Anderson v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
104 For clarification purposes, this Note will use “Anderson v. Cryovac” to reference the
appeal and trial summary in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988).
105 See HARR, supra note 5, at 95–119.
106 Anderson I, 96 F.R.D. at 431 (“Rule 11 is a useful tool to restrain frivolous and abu-
sive litigation. . . .  Rule 11 should not be used, however, to harass the serious litigant whose
claim may depend upon circumstantial evidence and may not be fully developed at the
time that the complaint is filed.”); see also HARR, supra note 5, at 107–19 (noting that Judge
Skinner admitted to being sympathetic towards Rule 11 motions: “I’m taking quite an
interest in Rule 11.  I think it’s been woefully ignored in the history of the federal rules,
and that has probably caused the dockets of this and other federal courts to be clogged
with a good deal of garbage over the years.”).
107 See GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at xxxi–xxxvii (providing a timeline listing
motions for reconsideration, summary judgment, and adding third parties, among others).
108 See HARR, supra note 5, at 183.  For an example of the number of deponents, see
GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 501–06 (listing approximately two hundred
individuals).
109 See e.g., HARR, supra note 5, at 153–54 (quoting Richard Aufiero recalling how his
son lost his battle with leukemia while in the backseat of his parents’ car driving to the
medical clinic: “ ‘He died on I-93, up by the Somerville exit.  We cut off and went to the fire
station—’ Richard was going to say more but he could not.  He was on the verge of tears.
He picked up a glass of water and drank deeply.”).
110 See id. at 183–93.
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attorney Schlichtmann for his inappropriate behavior in this deposition and
others.111
Third, a settlement agreement seemed impossible because victims, attor-
neys, journalists, and residents of Woburn all shared different personal inter-
ests in this litigation.  Despite encouragement from Judge Skinner and
multiple negotiation attempts, the parties failed to negotiate a settlement
offer, which heightened the court’s frustration with the case.112  After one
failed settlement negotiation, Judge Skinner called attorney Schlichtmann to
his chambers to discuss his distaste for Anne Anderson’s “trumpeting in the
newspapers.”113  The Boston Globe quoted Anne Anderson “saying that money
wasn’t important to her. ‘To me, it would be blood money in the strictest
sense.’”114  These plaintiffs wanted their day in court.
After thousands of discovery documents and months of depositions, the
case went to trial.  The trial was divided into three parts, the first of which
asked the jury to find whether W.R. Grace and/or Beatrice Foods contami-
nated the wells.  Both parties relied on a wide variety of expert witnesses and
scientific statistics to prove their claims.  For example, plaintiffs relied on
“[t]he Harvard Health Study, an exhaustive statistical study of over 7,000
Woburn residents in 1984 by professors at the Harvard School of Public
Health . . . [who] concluded that the data they compiled ‘strongly suggests
the water from [Woburn] Wells G and H is linked to a variety of adverse
health effects.’”115  While promising at first glance, this study used “statistical
discourse,” and it failed to show that the contaminants caused the
“hodgepodge of adverse health effects” in Woburn residents.116  In addition
to the Harvard School of Public Health, attorney Schlichtmann consulted Dr.
Alan Levin, an immunologist from California, who referred him to a patholo-
gist, and that pathologist referred Schlichtmann to a physician, who recom-
mended he hire a cardiologist, and the list goes on.117  The combination of
111 Id. at 225–27 (“I’ve read things in these depositions—outrageous things—that I’ve
never read before, and I’ve been here quite a while.  Swearing on the record, instructing
witnesses not to answer, counseling witnesses on their answers[.]”).
112 See generally id.
113 See id. at 280.
114 Id.
115 Blomquist, supra note 80, at 961 (third alteration in original) (quoting HARR, supra
note 5, at 133).  For the published Harvard Health Study, see generally S. W. Lagakos, B. J.
Wessen & M. Zelen, An Analysis of Contaminated Well Water and Health Effects in Woburn,
Massachusetts, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 583 (1986).
116 Blomquist, supra note 80, at 961.  It is important to note that this report sparked
controversy. See HARR, supra note 5, at 134 (“The American Industrial Health Council, an
industry research group, denounced the study as biased, and even one of [the author’s]
colleagues at Harvard stated, ‘It was an incredible mistake to use as interviewers people
who have a self-interest in the outcome.  To my mind, that just destroys the credibility of it
right there.’”).
117 See HARR, supra note 5, at 198–203; Blomquist, supra note 80, at 962–64
(“Schlichtmann ended up retaining a dozen different medical experts—including a neu-
rologist, a biochemist, and a toxicologist.” (emphasis omitted)).
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various expert witnesses sparked confusion, not cohesion, as groundwater
experts and other scientists contradicted themselves and one another.
After months of listening to witness and expert testimony, the jury delib-
erated for more than one week and concluded in favor of Beatrice Foods, but
against W.R. Grace.118  “While the jury found Schlichtmann’s evidence and
argument against Beatrice [Foods] insufficient to conclude that any toxic
chemicals had leached through the soil and contaminated plaintiffs’ drink-
ing water, the jury did find [W.R.] Grace responsible for contaminating Wells
G and H with TCE.”119  Following this jury decision on “phase one” of the
trial, both plaintiffs and W.R. Grace were spent and happy to settle.120  W.R.
Grace agreed to pay plaintiffs eight million dollars, and the case never con-
tinued to the next step.121  Meanwhile, Beatrice Foods walked free.122
Plaintiffs appealed the judgment for Beatrice Foods and, while the
appeal was pending, attorney Schlichtmann learned that a hydrogeological
report he requested during discovery had been withheld.123  In addition, wit-
nesses for Beatrice Foods confessed to perjury; John Riley, owner of John J.
Riley tannery, repeatedly testified that men at the tannery never dumped
chemicals in the marsh.  The discovery of this information urged plaintiffs to
move to vacate the judgment for Beatrice, but Judge Skinner denied this
motion.  Plaintiffs appealed this decision, too, consolidating it with their pre-
vious appeal on the merits.124  John Riley took the stand for a second time
during a misconduct hearing, and he confessed to not making true testimo-
nial statements at trial and admitted to having chemical formula books,
which he gave to defense attorneys during discovery who had then kept them
in a warehouse.125  Attorney Schlichtmann claimed these documents were
“highly probative,” especially one groundwater analysis report detailing the
“black sludge” tannery waste from Beatrice that had been dumped down the
hillside towards Wells G and H.126  This dragged the case back to court, but
118 See Joshua E. Gardner, A Tale of Two Cities: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Mass Tort
Settlements, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 547, 551 (2000) (book note).
119 Blomquist, supra note 80, at 968.
120 See HARR, supra note 5, at 442–51.  Judge Skinner urged plaintiffs to settle before
continuing to the next step in the trial because he was not convinced there was a link
between water and leukemia.  Attorney Schlichtmann felt he could never win the case in
front of this judge. Id. at 452.
121 Blomquist, supra note 80, at 968 n.84.
122 Id.
123 See Condlin, supra note 20, at 209.
124 See id. at 209–10.
125 As mentioned already, this information was discovered when plaintiffs filed a
motion for a new trial, see Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394 (D. Mass. 1989),
where Judge Skinner found John J. Riley had committed perjury and Mary Ryan, a member
of the defense counsel’s team, guilty of “deliberate misconduct” by not giving
Schlichtmann the reports located in the warehouse. See id. at 408; see also GROSSMAN &
VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 451; HARR, supra note 5, at 480–82.
126 See Blomquist, supra note 80, at 972–73 (quoting HARR, supra note 5, at 460).
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all of these appeals proved fruitless.127  Interestingly, the litigation concluded
when Judge Skinner ruled in favor of defendant’s Rule 11 motion in 1989.128
II. FLINT, MICHIGAN
A. Contamination
Now jump to April 2014.  Residents in Flint, Michigan, have begun to
notice a change in their drinking water.129  It is orangish-brown, makes their
children sick, and changing the water filter cartridge multiple times a month
offers no relief.130  It has been nearly fifty years since Anne Anderson and
her Woburn neighbors realized their water tasted funny and made their chil-
dren sick.  In those interim years, Congress has passed the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA) and state legislatures have established their own statutes
to further protect public drinking water.131  On top of that, the EPA has
been empowered to take “any action necessary” to protect a public drinking
water supply from contamination when state and local authorities have not
acted appropriately to curb the threat.132  Nonetheless, we see history repeat-
127 See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 933 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Condlin,
supra note 20, at 209–10 (noting that following the appeals, “[t]he First Circuit affirmed
the judgment on the merits in favor of Beatrice, but remanded the appeal from the denial
of the motion to set aside the judgment, for a determination of whether Beatrice had
knowingly or intentionally concealed the hydro-geological report.  On remand, after an
extensive evidentiary hearing . . . the district court concluded that . . . ‘concealment of the
Report . . . did not constitute substantial interference with the [plaintiffs’] preparation of
[the] . . . case.’  The district court then recommended that its earlier denial of the motion
to set aside the verdict be sustained, and the First Circuit agreed.” (alterations and second,
third, and fourth omissions in original) (footnotes omitted)).
128 See Facher, supra note 22, at 246 (“In his Final Report, Judge Skinner concluded
that there had been no substantial interference with any ‘tannery case’ and that no ‘tan-
nery case’ had ever existed.  Judge Skinner recommended that there be no new trial, and
that plaintiffs’ counsel be sanctioned for violating Rule 11 . . . by bringing and continuing
to prosecute a claim against the tannery knowing that there had been no evidence of any
use or disposal of TCE by the tannery.”).
129 See Eric Moorman, “A Greater Sense of Urgency”: EPA’s Emergency Authority Under the
SDWA and Lessons from Flint, Michigan, 47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10786, 10786
(2017) (providing historical summary of water contamination in Flint and the federal gov-
ernment’s response through the EPA).
130 See Sherwin, supra note 16, at 657.
131 See Moorman, supra note 129, at 10787 n.5 (“The SDWA was enacted in the wake of
several disease outbreaks caused by waterborne contaminants, which ‘heightened aware-
ness of the inadequacy of the existing regulatory procedures to assure safe drinking
water.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-338, at 2 (1977))).  Michigan has some of the most
relaxed state standards for water contaminants called polyfluoroalkyl substances (or PFAS).
 See Nouhan, supra note 9 (“Michigan stands to have the lowest legal limits for PFAS in
drinking water if recommendations made by the Michigan PFAS Action Response Team
. . . are implemented.”).
132 See Moorman, supra note 129, at 10786 (citing section 1431 of the Safe Drinking
Water Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300i (2018)).  The Lead Copper Rule, enforced by the
EPA under the SDWA, regulates the quantity of lead in drinking water. See Toni M. Mas-
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ing itself.  On the television, on the cover of magazines and journals, and on
the radio, we hear the city of Flint is poisoning its residents with lead-filled
drinking water.133
Flint, like Woburn, is a blue-collar city centered around industries that
prospered in the first half of the twentieth century but have suffered major
economic setbacks since the 1960s.134  Deindustrialization in a Rust Belt city
urged “predominantly affluent, white families” to flee: “A once-booming
industrial city, Flint lost over twenty percent of its population due to the eco-
nomic downturn and the fall of the auto industry.”135  The recent financial
crisis in 2008 exacerbated these negative economic effects, causing then-Gov-
ernor Rick Snyder to declare of state of financial emergency in Flint in
2011.136
As a means of saving money, local Flint leaders decided to switch to a
cheaper water source, and residents were not pleased.137  Sound familiar?
“In Michigan, officials put an entire community at risk to save money, then
lost a bet that the risks would go unnoticed.”138  Since 1967, Flint drew its
drinking water from Lake Huron, as did Detroit and other nearby cities.139
However, in 2014 a state-appointed emergency manager decided it was best
to turn to the Flint River for drinking water instead.140  The Flint River had
supplied drinking water to residents in the past, but a 1955 report stated “the
river could no longer service the industrial and residential needs of its citi-
zens” due to the “‘unlawful pollution’ caused by landfills, factories,
meatpacking plants, and the city’s wastewater treatment plant.”141  It is diffi-
cult to overstate the high pollution levels in the Flint River, as “it has histori-
cally been used as a receptacle for biological waste, treated and untreated
saro & Ellen Elizabeth Brooks, Flint of Outrage, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 162 (2017)
(“The LCR does not provide a maximum contaminant level . . . for lead, because even
miniscule amounts of lead in potable water are unsafe.”).
133 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 3 (U.S. News); Nouhan, supra note 9 (Michigan public
radio); Worland, supra note 1 (Time magazine).
134 See Sherwin, supra note 16, at 660.  An important difference to note is that “[a]
staggering forty percent of Flint’s residents, most of whom are African American, live in
poverty,” and some research has indicated Flint’s water crisis was the result of racial dis-
crimination. See id. at 682, 684.  Race is presumed to not have been a factor in the Woburn
water crisis where a majority of residents are not African American.
135 Id. at 660.
136 Id.
137 See Smith, supra note 13.
138 Worland, supra note 1.
139 See Moorman, supra note 129, at 10786
140 See id.; Carmody, supra note 4 (“The switch was intended to save money, but instead
cost the mayor his job.”); see also Sherwin, supra note 16, at 661 (noting that the Flint City
Council was unable to vote on this water switch, but the former city mayor, Mayor Dayne
Walling, did support the change).
141 Sherwin, supra note 16, at 658 (quoting Tim Carmody, How the Flint River Got So
Toxic, THE VERGE (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/2/26/11117022/flint-
michigan-water-crisis-lead-pollution-history).  For details regarding Flint’s historical water
sources, see Massaro & Brooks, supra note 132, at 159–61.
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industrial and human waste, and salt and contaminants washed into the river
by rain or snow melt.”142  The water was so polluted in 1999 and 2000 that
residents were prohibited from “any direct contact” with the Flint River,
including swimming or fishing.143  But nearly fifteen years later, Flint officials
decided that very same water was safe enough to drink.144
Flint’s local government shared the same optimism as those in Woburn:
“‘Here’s to Flint,’ Mayor Dayne Walling said as he lifted a glass filled with tap
water.  Walling and other city and state officials were toasting the switch of
the city’s drinking water source from Detroit’s water system to the Flint
River.”145  Unfortunately, and remarkedly, no one tested or treated the water
prior to the switch.146  “Local officials failed to implement corrosion con-
trols, allowing lead to leach from pipes,” and as a result, the new water flow-
ing through the city’s pipes was a dark brownish color with a foul taste.147
Similar to those in Woburn, residents in Flint immediately voiced their con-
cerns to the local government.148  And when the government assured them
their water was safe to drink, Flint’s 100,000 inhabitants grew frustrated and
organized public demonstrations to protest their distrust.149
In reality, the water was far from safe.  Just months after the new water
started flowing, the city issued a water notice in the summer of 2014 urging
residents to boil their water multiple times to combat the high levels of E.
coli.150  The city then treated the water with disinfectant trihalomethanes
(THMs), but the high levels of THMs caused residents’ hair to fall out.151  As
Flint officials continued assuring residents the water was safe to drink, skepti-
cal professors and doctors began doing their own research, which proved to
be crucial.152  Professor Marc Edwards sent sample test kits to Flint homes,
finding that “overall results indicated that the lead in the water was at twenty-
five ppb [(parts per billion)], easily exceeding the Lead and Copper Rule’s
‘action level’ of fifteen ppb and directly contradicting the city’s own
142 Sherwin, supra note 16, at 658.
143 Id. at 659.  The water in the Flint River was so toxic that in 1999 “Flint officials
prohibited any direct contact with the river, including swimming and fishing.” Id.
144 See id. at 664.
145 Carmody, supra note 4.
146 See Sherwin, supra note 16, at 661; Smith, supra note 13.
147 Smith, supra note 13.
148 See Moorman, supra note 129, at 10786.
149 Carmody, supra note 4 (noting that Flint residents often chanted “Flint lives matter”
as a means of voicing their frustration with local government).
150 Sherwin, supra note 16, at 661–62.
151 Id. at 662 (“The particular concern with THMs in tap water lies in the fact that
chronic exposure to elevated levels may cause kidney, liver, or central nervous system
problems and even a cancer risk.  Hence, public water suppliers are required to inform the
public when levels are exceedingly high.  Around this time, Flint residents complained of
their hair falling out in clumps in the shower.” (footnote omitted)).
152 See id. at 672.  Sherwin’s “The Toxicology of Lead” section provides a thorough
analysis of the side effects of lead poisoning and how it is especially detrimental to chil-
dren. See, e.g., id at 673–75.
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results.”153  Further, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, a pediatrician at a hospital in
Flint, conducted her own research and found that “the blood lead levels in
Flint children had doubled and nearly even tripled since the city had
switched to the Flint River.”154  At that time, and still today, the CDC and the
EPA reemphasize the fact that there is no “safe level” of lead.155  Lead should
never be in drinking water, without exception.
This research, coupled with local demonstrations and national news
reports, convinced the local government to test the Flint River.156  The inde-
pendent research findings were affirmed—the city’s testing results revealed
dangerous levels of lead, carcinogens, and pathogens such as E. coli and
Legionella in the Flint River.157  In addition to the thousands of children
who drank dangerous quantities of lead for months and now suffer from lead
poisoning, at least twelve residents died in a Legionnaires’ outbreak linked to
untreated water.158  Worst of all, when the city learned of this contamination,
officials hesitated to act: “Although city, state, and federal officials were aware
of this contamination as early as February 2015, it was not until December
2015—nearly a year later—that the city of Flint declared a state of emer-
gency.”159  Put differently, “[o]fficials then intentionally concealed data and
made false statements in an attempt to downplay the health dangers posed by
using Flint’s tap water, and forwent treatment of the contaminated water that
allegedly would have cost only  $150 per day.”160
In October 2015, officials ceased pumping from the Flint River and
reconnected to the water source from Lake Huron (today called the Great
Lakes Water Authority).161  After the city declared a state of emergency on
December 14, 2015, Governor Snyder declared a state of emergency on Janu-
153 Id. at 672.  The Lead and Copper Rule is a provision in the Safe Drinking Water Act
which sets standards for lead and copper levels in drinking water.  Federal action is author-
ized with water testing more than fifteen parts per billion. Id. at 689–90.
154 Id. at 672–73.  Dr. Hanna-Attisha received pushback: “Concerned about the public’s
safety, she immediately held a press conference regarding her findings and was subse-
quently denounced by the state of Michigan as an ‘unfortunate researcher’ who was caus-
ing ‘mass hysteria.’” Id. at 673 (quoting Chris D’Angelo, How a Stubborn Pediatrician Forced






155 See id. at 672–74.
156 See id.; Moorman, supra note 129, at 10786.
157 Moorman, supra note 129, at 10786.
158 Smith, supra note 13; see Sherwin, supra note 16, at 662–63 (“Legionnaires’ Disease,
a deadly form of pneumonia caused by a certain bacteria that can multiply in untreated
water systems . . . sickened at least eighty-seven people in the Flint area . . . .”).
159 Moorman, supra note 129, 10786.
160 Massaro & Brooks, supra note 132, at 156 (footnote omitted).
161 See id. at 168.
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ary 14, 2016.  President Barack Obama then declared a state of national
emergency two days later, authorizing EPA action.162
B. Litigation . . . ?
Where are Flint residents now in their search for justice?
In the past few years, 15 city and state officials have been indicted for their
actions related to the crisis.  About half have cut plea deals.  No one has
gone to jail.  And the remaining criminal cases are stalled as Michigan’s new
attorney general tries to decide how to proceed.  Meanwhile, multiple civil
lawsuits against state and federal agencies and private contractors are grind-
ing their way through the courts.163
While some research has focused on the unsuccessful criminal cases,164 this
Note aims its attention at the civil lawsuits “grinding their way through” our
justice system.
The national news has put a spotlight on Flint, which pressured the state
and federal governments to fund new pipes in the water system.165  But even
though most of the city’s old lead pipes have been replaced with new copper
pipes, “residents are still advised to use filters on their taps as the pipe
replacements continue.”166  More than one-third of residents still live below
the poverty line and many still drink bottled water in fear.  Most importantly,
it will be years before people in Flint learn how the lead in their water hin-
dered brain development in their children.167  Flint resident and community
activist Melissa Mays summarizes this recovery period: “In some ways we’re
better . . . .  In other ways, we’re forever poisoned, damaged, traumatized . . .
that’s not gonna ever be better.”168  New water pipes are only the beginning
of recovery for Flint.  Justice will come when special education programs help
get children back on track in school to counter their cognitive development.
Justice will come when residents no longer wait in line at the local church for
bottled water each week because they will trust the water coming from their
faucets.169  Justice will come when wrongdoers work together to rebuild the
socioeconomic safety net eroded by lead.
III. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
Despite receiving an eight-million-dollar settlement, Woburn plaintiffs
did not feel vindicated.  They drank contaminated water for fifteen years,
162 See id.
163 Carmody, supra note 4.
164 See generally Smith, supra note 13.
165 See Carmody, supra note 4.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. (second omission in original).
169 See Smith, supra note 13 (stating that “in Flint, a city where faith in government was
already low and where many residents still refuse to drink the tap water,” residents wait in
lines for bottled water).
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their children died and suffered from leukemia, and they deserved an apol-
ogy from those responsible.  It is difficult to say Woburn plaintiffs “had their
day in court” because the case settled after one-third of the trial, before
determining whether the contamination caused the cancer cluster.  Anne
Anderson and her neighbors did not have the opportunity to testify, and the
court never decided whose contamination caused their families’ illnesses.
Alexis Temkin, a toxicologist at a research organization called the Envi-
ronmental Working Group, highlights one of the main problems: “Legal
standards are often compromises between what the data shows in terms of
toxicity and risk, and how much it’s going to cost.”170  The Woburn litigation
is an example of a legal compromise due to the overwhelming complexity of
the case.  And the events in Flint may be even more complex than those in
Woburn—there are thousands of plaintiffs and municipal, state, and federal
actors involved, and it will be years before we see the side effects of lead
poisoning.  Despite these challenges, there are a number of ways Flint can
present a stronger case in civil court so that its residents will not suffer from
the same legal compromises as in Woburn.
The following Sections will analyze monumental aspects of the Woburn
trial, such as the complaint, the trifurcation, and the jury verdict.  If Flint
litigants can avoid these same decisions, they will be more successful in their
civil suit.
A. Complaint
Flint’s civil suit can be strengthened if plaintiffs provide a narrower com-
plaint.  In Anderson v. Cryovac, the complaint listed dozens of plaintiffs and
their individual injuries that occurred as a result of drinking the water from
Wells G and H.171  Specifically, the complaint identified eight of these plain-
tiffs as children who died or suffered from leukemia.172  Then, the complaint
listed twenty-eight plaintiffs who “suffered a direct adverse physical [e]ffect
and ha[ve] an increased risk of leukemia, other cancers, liver disease, central
nervous system disorders and other unknown illness and disease.”173  Listing
all of these individuals and their varied illnesses makes it difficult to prove
causation.174  For example, “[p]erhaps the genetic background of the chil-
dren had initiated the leukemias.  Maybe health habits (such as the quality of
diet, exercise[,] and medical care) had triggered the disease in some of the
children.”175  As Peter Schuck emphasizes in his book Agent Orange on Trial:
Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts, mass tort cases differ from traditional tort
cases because the nature of the injury is not typically straightforward, and
170 Worland, supra note 1.
171 See GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 61–80 (Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint).
172 Id. at 73–74.
173 Id. at 75–77.
174 See Blomquist, supra note 80, at 958–59.
175 Id. at 960.
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mass tort cases must be litigated in a way that accounts for all the possible
scenarios.176
In the toxic tort dispute, the nature of the injury is very different and the
processes of establishing, defining, and measuring that injury are far more
complex. . . . Often the pathways of causation are difficult to detect, the time
periods extend over decades, and the effects are not readily isolated or scien-
tifically understood.177
Plaintiffs’ difficulty overcoming this can be seen with the several inconclusive
expert testimonies.178  Because medical experts could not provide a determi-
nate answer for the causation of each specific injury, attorney Schlichtmann
consulted a dozen experts who created an incohesive mess.179  For example,
the Harvard Health Study strongly suggested the water was linked to adverse
health effects, but “did not show that the contaminated well water had actu-
ally caused the hodgepodge of adverse health effects suffered by the residents
of east Woburn.”180  One medical expert “believed that constant low-level
exposure to TCE had damaged the immune systems of all the members of
the Woburn families,” and he assured the plaintiffs “[t]hese chemicals always
do something.”181  In order to find causation, the court needs more concrete
evidence than those general claims.  Defendants poked holes in the plain-
tiff’s case before trial even began:
[I]n pre-trial skirmishing, [W.R.] Grace’s lawyer, William Cheeseman,
brought to the attention of the court a newspaper article quoting a research
assistant for the plaintiffs who apparently had admitted that there was “no
firm proof of a connection between the families, the chemicals found in
their wells, and the two companies.”182
Rather than bring an expansive complaint, Flint litigants should tailor
their complaint to one specific illness, such as lead poisoning.  In addition, a
claim may be more successful in court if it is tailored to one family in particu-
lar because households all use water in different ways.  Alternatively, the Flint
litigation may be more promising if the civil suit is brought as a class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  Lewis A. Grossman and Robert G.
Vaughn discuss whether the Woburn litigation should have been brought as
a class action, and they highlight advantages of this approach.183  While it is
difficult to say whether the Woburn case could have met all of the class action
176 See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN
THE COURTS (1986).
177 Id. at 8–9.
178 See Blomquist, supra note 80, at 960–64.
179 See id. “Almost every medical expert Schlichtmann talked to knew another expert
that Schlichtmann might want to talk to.” HARR, supra note 5, at 206.
180 Blomquist, supra note 80, at 961 (emphasis in original).
181 HARR, supra note 5, at 136–37.
182 Blomquist, supra note 80, at 967 (quoting HARR, supra note 5, at 100).
183 See GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 185–88 (noting, for example, that a class
action approach could have encouraged east Woburn families to join who otherwise
declined to participate in the litigation).
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requirements, a class action approach would have offered at least a partial
solution to the commonality of claims problem.184  As this Note details in the
following Section, complex complaints often force judges to separate trials
into distinct parts, a controversial practice which tends to disadvantage plain-
tiffs.185  Overall, future litigants should consider narrowly tailoring their
complaint to ease the burden of proving causation for a number of different
illnesses for a number of different people.
B. Trifurcation
Flint litigants may also strengthen their civil suit by avoiding a seg-
mented trial, as segmented trials often pose disadvantages for plaintiffs.  In
Anderson v. Cryovac, Judge Skinner feared the complexity of the claims and
the amount of evidence would confuse the jury.186  To combat the confu-
sion, he decided to trifurcate the trial into a responsibility phase, a causation
phase, and a damages phase.187  Notably, Judge Skinner made this decision
on the eve of the trial after jury selection, rather than in a pretrial conference
months before.188  The first stage asked whether Beatrice Foods and W.R.
Grace could be responsible for the contamination of Wells G and H.  Judge
Skinner emphasized that “[u]nless you get the product being dumped on the
property and getting into the water, there’s no case.  There’s no point in
going any further.”189  If the first question was answered in the affirmative,
then the second stage asked whether those chemicals caused the sicknesses
and deaths of the Woburn families’ children.  Only if the jury decided both
those stages in the affirmative would the court move to the third stage to
assess how much compensation the families should receive.190  “Thus the
link between [W.R.] Grace, Beatrice and the water, and the link between the
water and the injuries were presented separately.”191  As discussed, even
though W.R. Grace was found responsible in the first stage, the court never
184 Id.
185 See Sandra A. Smith, Polyfurcation and the Right to a Civil Jury Trial: Little Grace in the
Woburn Case, 25 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 649, 653 (1998) (“Complexity is the often cited
justification for such a piecemeal approach to mass tort trials.”); infra Section II.B,
“Trifurcation.”
186 HARR, supra note 5, at 285 (“You’ve got thirty-three plaintiffs, and to submit all
thirty-three of these causation and damage issues in one trial may be unbelievably cumber-
some.  It’s very complicated.”).
187 See HARR, supra note 5, at 286–87; Blomquist, supra note 80, at 971.
188 See Blomquist, supra note 80, at 971; see also Gardner, supra note 118, at 552, 561–62
(indicating Judge Skinner’s bias against the plaintiffs).  Researchers discuss Judge Skin-
ner’s bias as a reason for the outcome of the case.  While these findings may have merit,
this Note does not intend to offer any opinion about Judge Skinner’s biases.  Even those
who feel Judge Skinner was biased, such as Robert Blomquist, admit that “the judge was
right to be concerned about the potential for jury confusion and the practical difficulties
of addressing all claims by all litigants in one trial.”  Blomquist, supra note 80, at 971.
189 HARR, supra note 5, at 287 (alteration in original).
190 See HARR, supra note 5, at 286–87; Blomquist, supra note 80, at 971.
191 Blomquist, supra note 80, at 971.
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continued to the second and third stages because the parties reached a settle-
ment agreement of eight million dollars.192  The jury never heard testimony
from Anne Anderson or other mothers who lost a child to leukemia.
Segmenting trials is an unpopular practice because many believe the
separation infringes on plaintiffs’ rights to a fair trial.193  “While [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure] 42(b) permits judges to split issues at trial, applying
the rule to mass tort cases has unique implications.  The intricacies and com-
plexities of the cases magnify the effects of issue separation.”194  As seen in
Anderson v. Cryovac, the plaintiffs could not present evidence regarding the
victims or their illnesses until the jury decided the defendants’ liability, and
this cut out the human aspect of the case.  One could imagine the jury decid-
ing the case differently if they had heard a child with leukemia on the witness
stand, for example.  Parsing the trial into discrete sections “takes away the
jury’s ability to add their sense of fairness to the verdict,” one of the main
reasons courts value the jury right.195  The judicial system appreciates the
humanity jurors bring to a courtroom; jurors “infus[e] the law with the values
of the community” and “serv[e] as a check on judicial power.”196
Courts have famously cited the fear that limiting jury decisions to causa-
tion creates a “sterile or laboratory atmosphere in which causation is parted
from the reality of injury.”197  This “sterile or laboratory atmosphere” was
present in tort cases such as In re Bendectin Litigation, which was decided
around the same time as the Woburn case.198  In Bendectin Litigation, the jury
was asked if the antinausea drug Bendectin caused birth defects.199  The dis-
trict court judge polyfurcated the trial, separating causation from damages,
so the jury heard strictly scientific testimony from nineteen expert witnesses
before returning a verdict for the defendant.200
If Flint litigants wish to present the strongest case possible, they should
avoid this trial segmentation.  While judges continue to use polyfurcation as a
solution to complexity, future litigants should emphasize the importance of
192 See HARR, supra note 5, at 446–54.
193 See Albert P. Bedecarré, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme: Polyfurcation of Liability
Issues in Environmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 123, 124–25 (1989); Joseph
Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 75 (1993); Smith, supra note 185, at 652.
194 See generally Smith, supra note 185, at 652 (providing a thorough analysis of Rule
42(b)’s history and trial implications).
195 Id. at 654.
196 Id. at 666 (alterations in original) (citing Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans, & Elizabeth
C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 727, 728 (1991); and then citing Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1033–34 (1992)).
197 See Bedecarré, supra note 193, at 125 (quoting In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695
F.2d 207, 217 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983)).
198 See generally In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290, 315 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting In
re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d at 217).
199 See id. at 312.
200 See Bedecarré, supra note 193, at 151–52 & n.201.
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preserving the humanity in their cases, and they can refer to the Bendectin
Litigation, as well as In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, for support.  Future liti-
gants can also offer alternatives.  Instead of trifurcating the Woburn case,
attorney Schlichtmann proposed using a “‘test case’ involving one family in
which he would introduce the testimony of the mother about her deceased
child’s illness, then present evidence regarding [W.R.] Grace’s and Beatrice’s
contamination of the wells, and finally present medical expert testimony to
establish a connection between the contamination and the illnesses.”201
Even though Judge Skinner rejected this proposal, other judges may appreci-
ate it.  Employing a “test case” like this would allow the plaintiffs to introduce
testimony from victims, and future litigants should consider this as an alter-
native to segmentation.
C. Jury Verdict
Lastly, Flint litigants should encourage the use of simple jury verdict
forms.  If there is one thing parties in Anderson v. Cryovac can agree on, it is
the fact that the jury’s verdict illustrated a misunderstanding among some or
all of the jurors.202  The jury verdict form asked four special interrogatories
for both W.R. Grace and Beatrice Foods.  Each of the four interrogatories
were to be answered with respect to three specific chemicals (trichloroethyl-
ene, tetrachloroethylene, and 1, 2 transdichloroethylene):
1. Have the plaintiffs established by a preponderance of the evidence that
any of the following chemicals were disposed of at the Grace site after
October 1, 1964 and substantially contributed to the contamination of
Wells G and H by these chemicals prior to May 22, 1979?203
. . .
2. If you have answered “Yes” in question 1 as to any chemical(s), what,
according to the preponderance of the evidence, was the earliest time
that such chemical(s) disposed of on the Grace site after October 1,
1964 made a substantial contribution to the contamination of Wells G
and H—with respect to [Month and Year?]204
. . .
3. If you have answered “Yes” in question 1 as to any chemical(s), please
answer the following question: Have the plaintiffs established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the substantial contribution to the con-
tamination of Wells G and H prior to May 22, 1979 by chemicals
disposed of on the Grace site after October 1, 1964 was caused by negli-
201 Gardner, supra note 118, at 561.
202 See HARR, supra note 5, at 381–93, 384 (“[T]he clerk brought all the evidence up to
the jury room—it took him several trips—and the list of questions that had been devised
for them to answer.  Jean Coulsey studied the questions in astonishment.  And she wasn’t
the only one surprised by them.  The others looked confused and perplexed, too.”).
203 GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 652–53 (reprinted copy of the Special Inter-
rogatories to the Jury as to W.R. Grace & Co).
204 Id. at 652.
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gence of Grace, that is, the failure of Grace to fulfill any duty of due care
to the plaintiffs . . . [?]205
. . .
4. If you have answered “Yes” to any part of question 3, what, according to
a preponderance of the evidence, was the earliest time at which the sub-
stantial contribution referred to in question 3 was caused by the negli-
gent conduct of this defendant—with respect to [Month and Year?]206
Jurors endured more than one week of deliberation because they reread
the questions multiple times “trying to parse the compound sentences.”207
Juror “William Vogel remembered saying, ‘I thought we were just supposed
to find them guilty or innocent.’”208  While the jury answered “no” to each
chemical on question one of Beatrice Food’s verdict form, the jury did
answer “yes” to two chemicals on question one of W.R. Grace’s verdict form
(as to trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene).209  However, the jury’s
decision regarding question two demonstrated a lack of confidence in their
first answer.  In the second question, they answered “ND” or “Not Deter-
mined,” indicating they were unable to identify the month and year when the
toxic chemicals made “a substantial contribution to the contamination of
Wells G and H.”210  Most importantly, when question four asked the earliest
time W.R. Grace’s negligent conduct could have substantially contributed to
the contamination, the jury listed the date of September 1973 (regarding
trichloroethylene).211  Thus, the jury found that September 1973, years after
some of the plaintiffs were already diagnosed with leukemia, was the earliest
time defendant’s actions contributed to the contamination in Wells G and
H.212
Immediately following the verdict, Judge Skinner said the jury’s answers
were “puzzling and raised some problems, especially the September 1973
date.”213  Plaintiffs expressed deep concern over this verdict: “Losing Bea-
trice was bad enough.  What made the verdict even worse, however, was the
September 1973 date the jurors had given for Grace.  Three of the Woburn
children—Jimmy Anderson, Michael Zona, and Kevin Kane, Jr.—had gotten
leukemia before that date.”214  The jury did not anticipate having to answer
205 Id. at 653.
206 Id.
207 HARR, supra note 5, at 384.
208 Id.
209 See GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 652–53.  By answering “no” on question
one regarding Beatrice Food’s contribution to the contamination, the jury exonerated
Beatrice Foods and did not need to answer the remaining questions.
210 Id.
211 Id.  The jury could not determine a time regarding tetrachloroethylene, and thus
answered “ND.”
212 Id.; HARR, supra note 5, at 392–94.
213 HARR, supra note 5, at 393.
214 Id. at 394.  “[Schlichtmann] did not understand how they had arrived at the date,
and he needed time to study it.  But he assured the families that they were still all in the
case together.  He would try to find a way around the date.  And if that failed, he could still
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these specific questions.  How can one expect a group of jurors to pinpoint
the exact month and date that each contaminant entered the groundwater,
especially considering only one-third of the evidence had been presented?
Those wordy interrogatories would baffle the average person, and it was
unfair to ask the jury to answer those specific details.  Although Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 49(a) authorized Judge Skinner to use special verdict
forms, the “four Special Interrogatories . . . have since become targets for
discussion and controversy, the blanket charge being that they were too com-
plex and confusing for the jury to understand.”215
Future litigants should adopt a simpler form of jury verdicts, such as the
verdict form used in the Bendectin Litigation which asked for a yes or no
answer.216  Even if the Flint litigation poses complexity and special verdict
forms are needed, plaintiffs can employ methods to break down the case step
by step to ensure jury comprehension.  For example, instead of formatting
the first question reprinted above, ask the jury, “Have the plaintiffs estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence that [W.R.] Grace disposed of
chemicals on the site after October 1, 1964?”217  And, if so, did “this substan-
tially contribute[ ] to the contamination of Wells G and H [before] May 22,
1979?”218  Comprehensive verdict forms will strengthen future litigants’ suits
and ensure fairness in the decisionmaking process.
CONCLUSION
Can nine years of litigation be called “speedy”?  Can litigation that con-
sumed tens of thousands of hours of work by hundreds of people at the cost
of tens of millions of dollars be fairly characterized as “inexpensive”?  And
can the resolution be termed “just”?  It was a resolution that involved a trial
at which no family member was allowed to tell his or her story; legal judg-
ments about the world which facts and the passage of time have demon-
strated were clearly wrong; and a record that was admittedly corrupted.219
We have a great deal to learn from Woburn, and Flint is the best place to
start.  Flint shares similarities with Woburn—blue-collar cities suffering from
disappearing industries whose residents bear the burden with unsafe drink-
ing water.  But the Flint case also offers significant differences.  We now have
federal regulations such as the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water
Act, and we have an entire agency dedicated to environmental safety.  Sci-
ence and medicine have advanced, and we have discovered important facts
about our health in the past fifty years.
prove that exposure to the solvent had aggravated the illnesses of Jimmy Anderson and the
other and hastened their deaths.” Id. at 395.
215 GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at xx (William Cheeseman’s account of the
trial).
216 See Bedecarré, supra note 193, at 143 n.149 (citing In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
“Bendectin” Prods. Liab. Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1222 (S.D. Ohio 1985)).
217 GROSSMAN & VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 652.
218 Id.
219 Id. at xxvi (providing Jan Schlichtmann’s account of the Woburn trial).
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Yet we see history repeating itself.  How is it possible that with all of these
new developments we see another Woburn contamination crisis?  Federal
regulations empower the EPA to act during contamination threats, but these
“emergency powers” must be authorized more often and with urgency.
When President Obama activated EPA assistance in Flint in January 2016,
residents there had already been drinking the poisonous water for years.
Importantly, Flint is not the exception.  Contaminated water has become the
norm.220  As weekly news reports describe another contamination outbreak
in a different part of the country, we have become numb to it.  “A 2017
report card from the American Society of Civil Engineers gave the nation’s
drinking-water infrastructure a rating of D, and assessed that the U.S. needs
to invest $1 trillion in the next 25 years for upgrades.”221  When will we start
making these investments?  Even though the Woburn litigation ended
decades ago, there are people in Flint still lacking clean drinking water.
There is still time for justice for Flint, and now is a good time to start.
220 See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
221 Worland, supra note 1.
